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Abstract 
This study examined the relationship between workplace safety climate factors, individual 
psychological health factors, and self-reported errors and violation behaviours. The aim was to 
test hypotheses about different causal pathways for errors and procedural violations. A total of 
308 aviation maintenance engineers completed a self-report questionnaire developed for this 
study. A structural model depicting workplace violations and psychological health acting as 
mediators between safety climate and errors was tested using structural equation modelling. The 
model fitted the data with safety climate accounting for 63% of the variance in violations and 
52% of the variance in psychological health. Violations and psychological health combined to 
predict 58% of the variance in errors. The study demonstrates the importance of including both 
organizational and individual level variables to assess the safety status of an organization 
through the use of expanded safety climate surveys.  
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A test of Direct and Indirect Pathways Linking Safety Climate, Psychological Health, and 
Unsafe Behaviours 
The concept of everyday cognitive failings was first introduced in the late 1800s by 
William James (1890) but sustained scientific interest in the concept had to await the advent of 
complex industrial technologies that stretched workers to their physical and mental limits. High-
risk organizations such as offshore oil, nuclear power, chemical processing plants and aviation 
are unforgiving environments where errors can have devastating consequences. Growing 
concern about the cause of errors has led researchers to consider the impact of constructs such as 
safety climate, attitudes, social norms, stress, and cognition on safety behaviours such as errors 
and violations. However, much of this research is piecemeal. What is needed in the literature are 
studies that bring together these constructs in structural models that can be tested, thus providing 
empirical support for what are sometimes no more than descriptive models of error causation. 
The present study used structural equation modelling to test models of the direct and indirect 
effects of safety climate factors and individual psychological health on self-reported errors and 
violations in aviation maintenance. In the sections that follow, we trace the development of 
theory in this area of safety research before describing the development of a model that posits 
different causal pathways for errors and violations. 
A group of researchers working mainly in the offshore oil industry (Fleming, Flin, 
Mearns, & Gordon, 1998; Mearns & Flin, 1999; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001) 
modelled the accident causation process using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). They 
hypothesised that people’s perceptions of various organizational processes and practices – what 
is now called “safety climate” - influence the state of safety in the organization and that these 
perceptions can be captured using self-report questionnaires. Studies of safety climate by Flin 
and her colleagues shed some light on the potential contributors to accidents, with climate 
measures capturing up to 50% of the variance in safety outcomes.  
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These findings have been replicated in other industries and it is now accepted that safety 
climate measures can help to predict safety behaviours (Clark, 2006; Johnson, 2007). These 
findings appear to hold, whether the dependent variable is a self-reported measure of safety 
behaviour or actual measures of safety outcomes (e.g., Zohar, 2000; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Johnson, 2007). Researchers in this area have therefore begun to pursue other lines of enquiry. 
One very active line of enquiry concerns the refinement of measurement instruments with which 
to capture the essential elements of safety climate and there are now many well-validated 
instruments from which to choose (e.g., Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004; Silva, Lima, & 
Baptista, 2004; Evans, Glenda, & Creed, 2007). 
A second line of enquiry aims to establish the mechanisms by which climate influences 
safety behaviours. Working within this tradition, Fogarty (2004) employed a safety climate 
approach to assist in the development of a model to explain morale, psychological health, 
turnover intentions, and error in the aviation maintenance environment. An instrument called the 
Maintenance Environment Survey (MES) was constructed and administered to 240 personnel 
responsible for maintenance of a large military helicopter fleet. The structural model predicted 
45% of the variance in psychological health, 67% of the variance in morale, 27% of the variance 
in turnover intentions, and 44% of the variance in self-reported maintenance errors. In a follow-
up study, Fogarty (2005) administered a revised version of the MES to 150 aviation maintenance 
personnel to test the fit of a model in which the effect of safety climate on errors was partially 
mediated by individual level factors, such as psychological strain. He found support for the 
model and argued that in the efforts to secure better safety outcomes, a dual focus should be 
maintained on organizational and individual level variables.  
Within this same tradition, other researchers have taken a broader approach. Neal and 
Griffin (2006) used a longitudinal design to explore the role of safety motivation as a potential 
mediator of the safety climate-safety behaviour relationship. They reaffirmed the connection 
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between climate and behaviour but warned that it takes time for positive changes in safety 
climate and safety motivation to manifest themselves in lower accident rates. Among the 
recommendations flowing from their study was that researchers not treat safety behaviour as a 
unidimensional construct. They identified safety compliance and safety participation as 
examples of distinct constructs that are usually not separated in studies of safety outcomes. The 
present study adopts that same view, arguing that errors and violations are distinct safety 
outcomes that need to be treated differently.  
The Current Study 
Dekker (2003) noted that in modern usage error can mean three things: 1) error as the 
cause of failure (e.g., proficiency); 2) error as the failure itself (e.g., wrong decision); and 3) 
error as process, as an intentional departure from some kind of standard. Not distinguishing 
between these different possible definitions of error is a problem. To reduce this conceptual 
confusion, we propose that this third category of errors be labelled violations, a term already 
used by many researchers in this area. It is further proposed that errors and violations have 
different causes and that the distinction is therefore not simply a matter of nomenclature. In a 
broad sense, it has been said that errors tend to result from cognitive, social and organizational 
factors, and violations tend to result from attitudinal, social and organizational factors (e.g., 
Reason, 1995; Reason, 1997; Sutcliffe & Rugg, 1998). The proposition that errors and violations 
have different aetiologies is therefore not new, but it is often overlooked. Furthermore, the 
empirical evidence supporting this intuitive link is weak because most studies have focused on 
either errors (Fogarty, 2004, 2005) or violations (e.g., Lawton, Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 
1997; Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003). There is a need for studies that 
include both variables, linking them in a hypothetical nomological net that can be tested using 
SEM techniques.  
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The measurement part of the model comprised four elements: indicators for Safety 
Climate, Psychological Health, Violations, and Errors. The structural part of the model 
comprised the hypothesised linkages between these four dimensions. Figure 1 shows the full 
model.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In Figure 1, Safety Climate is represented by the reflective indicators Management 
Support, Commitment to Safety, Management’s Awareness of Violations, Communication 
Effectiveness, Access to Resources, Training, and Workload. Fatigue, Strain and GHQ are 
reflective indicators of the underlying construct called Psychological Health. Error Causes, Error 
Types, and Mistakes are reflective indicators of the construct Errors. Violation Attitude and 
Violation Behaviour are reflective indicators of a construct called Violations. Because most of 
the scales used in the present study were adapted from those already reported and validated in 
the literature, they were expected to define their hypothesised underlying dimensions. 
The first part of the structural model comprises the direct link between Safety Climate 
and Psychological Health and a further direct link to Errors, thus modelling the indirect linkage 
between Safety Climate and Errors noted by Fogarty (2004, 2005). The second element in the 
structural model comprises the direct link between Safety Climate and Violations and a further 
direct link to Errors. In support of the first of these links, Helmreich (2000) suggested that 
violations can stem from a culture of non-compliance, perceptions of invulnerability, or poor 
procedures. He also reported that over half the “errors” observed in a line audit safety operations 
(LOSA) exercise were due to violations and that those who violated procedures were more likely 
to commit other types of errors.  Mearns et al. (2001) found pressure for production and work 
pressure explained 58% of the variance in a construct they labelled Safety Behaviours, with 
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pressure for production being the main contributor. Scales measuring violations often appear in 
the literature as safety behavior scales, so this finding supports the direct link between Safety 
Climate and Violations. Other researchers have confirmed this link (e.g., Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 
2000; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomás, & Cox, 2002; Rundmo, 2000; Rundmo et al., 1998). The final 
link, that between Violations and Errors, is strongly supported by the literature where various 
researchers have shown that procedural violations are the best predictors of accident involvement 
(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Lawton, Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1997; Lawton & Parker, 
1998; Meadows, Stradling, & Lawson, 1998; Mearns et al., 2001).  
We labelled this Model 1, the fully mediated model. Two competing models were also 
tested. Reason (1997) proposed that unsafe acts are caused by workplace conditions (safety 
climate factors) such as inadequate tools and equipment, undue time pressure, insufficient 
training, under-staffing, poor supervisor-worker ratios, and unworkable procedures. Therefore 
Model 2 differed from Model 1 in that it included an additional pathway from Safety Climate to 
Errors. We called this the partially mediated mode.. Model 3 was also a minor variation of 
Model 1 with a pathway fitted between Psychological Health and Violations to test whether the 
previously-noted direct effects of health on errors (Fogarty, 2004, 2005) extends to other forms 
of safety behaviours.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 308 maintenance personnel from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) were 
involved in the study. Of the personnel who completed the survey, 33.7% (N = 105) were from 
the Army, 27.6% (N = 86) from the Navy, and 37.2% (N = 116) from the Air Force.  
The Survey Instrument  
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) Flying Safety in Maintenance Climate Survey was 
developed for the present study in conjunction with subject matter experts from the ADF. The 
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survey was divided into eight sections: (a) Background Information, (b) Flying Safety, (c) 
Workplace Flying Safety, (d) Working Procedures and Practices, (e) Reporting Procedures and 
Practices, (f) Training and Resources, (g) Other Issues and (h) General Health. Some sections of 
the survey were of interest to the Directorate of Flying Safety but not to the authors. The 
subscales described below are those relevant to the current study.  
There were seven subscales in the Safety Climate section of the survey: 1) management 
support (Mgntsup) where three items measured how often management listened to safety 
concerns from subordinates such as supervisors and tradesmen (e.g., Managers listen to concerns 
from tradesmen/supervisors and react appropriately); 2)  safety commitment (Safecomm) where 
four items assessed how committed the organization, management, and colleagues were to safety 
(e.g., The ADF is committed to flying safety); 3) management’s awareness of conditions 
affecting safety (Mgntawar) where three items assessed management’s awareness of workplace 
pressure and resulting shortcuts (e.g., Managers are aware that the pressure placed on supervisors 
makes it necessary to take shortcuts/risks to achieve the task); 4) communication effectiveness 
(Commeff) where three items measured the extent to which management was successful in 
communicating safety issues to subordinates (e.g., Management communicates issues effectively 
to tradespersons); 5) access to resources (Resacc) where four items assessed the availability of 
various resources such as personal protective equipment, manuals, equipment, and tools (e.g., I 
have access to all the tools that I need for my work); 6) training standards (Train) where seven 
items were used to assess the adequacy of training, including on-the-job training, trade skills, 
systems knowledge and formal training (e.g., The trade skills of junior personnel are adequate); 
7) Workload (Workload), which was assessed using five items that rated the complexity of task 
performance (e.g., I undertake tasks concurrently to get the job done). 
The Safety Climate items mostly employed 5-point ratings that ranged from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Resources, Workload, and Management Support were rated on a 
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5-point scale that ranged from 1 (always) to 5 (never). Scores were recoded so that higher scores 
indicating a higher level of resources, workload and management support.  
After the climate section, three subscales were used to measure the latent construct 
Psychological Health.  The first of these was an abbreviated version of the strain scale used in 
Fogarty (2004, 2005). It comprised five items (e.g., How often do you feel stressed at work 
because of the job itself?). Four items were included to measure fatigue (e.g., How often do you 
feel fatigued at work because of the working hours?). Response options for both the strain and 
fatigue subscales ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (always). The third subscale was the 12-item 
version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ: Goldberg and Williams, 1988). The GHQ 
explores several aspects of psychological health and has been used as a measure of job-related 
strain (Parkes, 1992; Payne, Wall, Borrill, & Carter, 1999). Participants were required to respond 
to a number of statements regarding the state of their psychological health: anxiety and insomnia 
(e.g., Lost much sleep over worry?); social dysfunction (e.g., Have you felt that you are playing 
a useful part in things?); and severe depression (e.g., Been thinking of yourself as a worthless 
person?). Scores on this variable were recoded so that higher scores indicated better 
psychological health. 
The next section of the survey instrument used two subscales to measure procedural 
violations. In the first of these (Violbeh), comprising five items, respondents indicated how 
frequently they engaged in unsafe behaviours (e.g., I will temporarily disconnect or remove a 
part to make a job easier, but not document the disconnection/removal). Possible responses 
ranged from 1 (always) to 5 (never).  The second subscale (Violatt), comprising four items, 
tapped willingness to violate rules and procedures (e.g., I am prepared to take risks, other than 
those inherent in my job, to get a task done). Violatt employed a 5-point Likert scale that ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For both of these subscales, scores were recoded 
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so that higher scores denoted a higher occurrence of violations or a greater willingness to engage 
in procedural violations. 
In the final section of the survey, items from the Maintenance Environment Scale (MES: 
Fogarty, 2004) and the 48-item aircraft maintenance checklist developed by Hobbs and 
Williamson (2000) were used to form three marker variables for the latent construct, Errors. The 
first subscale (Errtype, 10 items), asked respondents to indicate how often they made different 
types of errors (e.g., I have missed out steps in maintenance tasks). In the second subscale 
(Errcaus, 10 items), respondents were required to indicate how often they had made errors 
because of different background factors (e.g., I make errors because of lack of concentration). In 
the third subscale (Mistakes, 4 items), respondents indicated how often they made mistakes due 
to training deficiencies (e.g., I make mistakes because my systems knowledge is lacking). 
Ratings for all subscales were made on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (always) to 5 (never). 
Scores were recoded so that higher scores represented the occurrence of more errors and 
mistakes. 
For all subscales, the dependent variable was the mean response for the subscale, that is, 
the total score divided by the number of items. 
Procedure 
The survey was administered to participant groups by serving members of the ADF 
Directorate of Flying Safety. Maintenance workers, maintenance officers, and personnel 
indirectly related to maintenance work were asked to participate in this study. The surveys were 
completed in group sessions lasting from 30 to 45 minutes and were then mailed to the university 
research team.  
Statistical Analyses 
The competing structural equation models were proposed and tested using the AMOS 4.0 
(Arbuckle, 1999) program. Model fit was assessed using Chi Square (χ2 ), the Chi Square to 
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degrees of freedom ratio (χ2/df), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the comparative fit index (CFI), 
and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA).  
Results 
 A small number of missing values were replaced using the expectation-maximisation 
(EM) algorithm (Roth, 1994) in SPSS version 10.0. Following data screening, descriptive 
statistics were compiled to ascertain the spread of scores on the indicator variables. The means 
and standard deviations show a reasonable spread of scores. Additional normality checks (not 
reported) showed positive skewness on safety commitment (Safecomm), access to resources 
(Resacc), and the two measures of violation behaviours. GHQ scores were negatively skewed. 
These outcomes were not surprising and the degree of skewness was not judged to be 
problematic for the multivariate analyses to follow. With the exception of the training subscale, 
the internal consistency reliability estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) for all variables were above .70, 
and most were above .80. 
The main aim of the study was to test the conceptual model shown in Figure 1 and to 
compare fit indices with those obtained for two competing models. These fit indices for these 
three models are summarised in Table 1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The fit indices for all three models were indistinguishable in terms of their fit to the data 
and were either on the borderline or within commonly recommended cut-off values for these fit 
indices.  Model 1, the fully mediated model, gave a slightly more parsimonious account of the 
data, however, so we selected it as our preferred model. The full measurement and structural 
model, with parameter estimates, is shown in Figure 2. 
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
All pathways shown in the model were significant. The model accounted for 51% of the 
variance in Psychological Health, 61% of the variance in Violations, and 58% of the variance in 
Errors. As well as the direct effects, there was a significant indirect effect of Safety Climate on 
Errors (b = .65, p < .01). 
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to validate and extend existing models of organizational and 
individual factors in the prediction of unsafe acts. The study brought together the key outcome 
variables of errors and violations and related these to organizational and individual factors in a 
model which described the direct and indirect effects of safety climate and individual 
psychological health on self-reported errors and violations. The outcomes support the claims of 
other researchers that safety climate directly influences violations (e.g., Oliver et al., 2002; 
Rundmo, 2000; Rundmo et al., 1998), and that individual health directly influences the 
frequency of errors (Fogarty, 2004, 2005). Specifically, a large amount of the variance in 
violations (63%) can be explained by the safety climate of the organization and a large amount 
of the variance in errors (58%) can be explained by the combined effects of safety climate and 
psychological health. This study has supported the proposition that errors and violations have 
different psychological antecedents. 
These findings are important to safety practitioners, particularly in the aviation industry. 
Hudson (2007) has written a very useful road map for implementing a safety culture in an 
organization. Towards the end of the paper, he warns academics against the dangers of 
continuing to refine measurement instruments instead of looking at how the instruments are used 
and what he calls coming “down from the trees” (p. 719) and engaging with industry. At the 
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same time, he emphasises the importance to industry of having well-founded empirically 
justified theories. We would like to think that our focus in this study on breaking down safety 
problem behaviours into two easily-recognised components and showing that they have different  
aetiologies places us near to the bottom of the tree. A one-size-fits-all approach to safety 
behaviours might well prove effective but it will be highly inefficient. Attempts to reduce 
intentional and unintentional unsafe acts should be aimed at both individual and organizational 
levels, with an understanding of the different origins of errors and violations.  
Whilst these findings replicate earlier research on errors and break new ground by 
considering errors and violations together, we should point out that the methodological 
shortcomings in this study. Firstly, using cross-sectional methodology is an evidently weak 
approach to causality (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). The use of self-report measures for all 
variables is also problematic in that there is the possibility of method variance as the source of 
commonality among the variables. One global concern of studies that involve structural equation 
modelling is that conclusions are likely to be limited to the particular sample. In this study, a 
restricted sample was used, that is, military aviation maintenance, and results should be treated 
cautiously when generalising beyond this population as the military population may not be 
representative of the maintenance population in general. 
Safety climate measures such as the ones used in these studies are very useful but they 
should be standardised so that the items and scales are basically the same across administrations, 
thus permitting the establishment of benchmarks on the various scales (Flin et al., 2000). The 
focus of the research up to this point has been the identification of key safety outcomes and 
defining the network of relationships among these variables and background climate variables. A 
further aim has to be the linking of self-report measures with actual performance outcomes, 
rather than simply using self-report as the basis of measurement operations. The low base rates 
of incidents and errors suggests that this research will involve higher level modeling, but it is our 
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expectation that the models developed to this point will prove useful in explaining safety data, 
whatever form it takes.  
In conclusion, the safety literature tends to be dominated by discussions of error 
taxonomies and descriptive models of accident causation, such as the Reason (1997) model.  We 
see these contributions as valuable but we also believe that they must be supported by empirical 
research. Structural equation modelling is a technique that can be used to test assumptions 
embedded in popular descriptions of accident causation. This study has developed and validated 
a model that encompasses a number of organizational, social and individual factors that predict a 
significant proportion of the variance in self-reported errors and violations. In ongoing studies, 
we are seeking to extend the model presented here to include incident reporting, another key 
psychological variable in the quest to achieve safer and more productive working environments. 
Safety will continue to be critical as complex high-risk industries, such as aviation, become more 
technologically-driven and complicated. Consequently, organizations will need to maintain a 
heightened awareness of safety, risk, and security. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Fit Statistics for Different Models 
Model χ2 df p χ2/df TLI CFI RMSEA 
1 182.66 86 < .01 2.12 .92 .94 .06 
2 182.62 85 < .01 2.15 .92 .94 .06 
3 180.89 85 < .01 2.13 .92 .94 .06 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model representing relations among Safety Climate, Psychological Health, 
Violations, and Errors (Indicator variables not shown) 
Figure 2. Empirical model representing relations among Safety Climate, Psychological Health, 
Violations, and Errors  
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